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CORPORATIONS WITHOUT REPRESENTATION:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GENDER DIVERSITY MANDATES
Talley Timms Ransil*
Abstract
Biases and structural barriers contribute to the glacial pace at which
women are represented on corporate boards. Even though companies with
at least one female board of director outperform companies with no female
directors, women only held 20% of board of director positions in 2019.
Companies nationwide would not reach gender equality in the boardroom
for decades without legally enforceable gender diversity requirements. In
response, California Senator Jackson proposed SB 826—requiring
California-based publicly held corporations to include at least one woman
on their board of directors. However, conservative legal organizations
filed lawsuits claiming California’s gender diversity mandate violates the
California Constitution because the mandate perpetuates sex-based
discrimination and is subject to strict scrutiny review. This Note proceeds
by examining California’s gender diversity mandate and discussing the
constitutionality of SB 826.
This Note finds that SB 826 is constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause and beneficial to qualified female board candidates and
the United States economy. SB 826 meets the intermediate scrutiny
requirements because the gender diversity mandate is substantially
related to a sufficiently important government interest and is narrowly
tailored. However, this Note also argues that, paradoxically, if states
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”), SB 826 would likely be
unconstitutional because the ERA’s ratification will presumably change
the standard of review for gender classifications from intermediate
scrutiny to strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court would
likely prohibit sex-conscious legislation designed to advance women’s
equality. This Note ultimately urges courts to uphold California’s gender
diversity mandate as a matter of public policy and law under the current
intermediate standard. SB 826 does not question whether women are
capable of getting into the boardroom; rather, it ensures that women have
an opportunity to earn a spot at the table.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last one hundred years, United States women have earned the right to
have equal access to job listings,1 be paid the same as their male counterparts,2 and
own a credit card.3 However, women’s equality in the workplace is still severely
lagging behind men.4 In 2019, women made up 57.4% of the United States labor
force5 and drove “70–80% of all consumer purchasing”6 but only held 20.4% of
board of director positions.7 In California, the number of female board members was
even lower; of California’s publicly held companies, one-fourth had no female
directors on their board, and for “the rest of the companies, women h[eld] only
15.5% of the board seats.”8 In response, California Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson
proposed Senate Bill No. 826 (“SB 826”)—requiring California-based publicly held
corporations to include women on their board of directors.9 Senator Jackson
1

Alanna Vagianos, 14 Rights Women Have Gained Since Earning the Right to Vote,
HUFFPOST (Sept. 27, 2016, 2:24 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/rights-women-havegained-since-earning-the-right-to-vote_n_57e9ed33e4b0c2407cd93434 [https://perma.cc/H
5SE-KPDW] (“In 1968, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ruled that the
standard practice of separating job listings and help wanted ads by sex was unlawful.”).
2
Id. (“In 1970, a U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co. that an
employer owed women the same compensation as men for jobs that are ‘substantially equal’
even if they are not ‘identical.’ This prevented employers from giving women different titles
than men in order to pay them less.”).
3
Id. (“In 1974, women finally gained the right to get a credit card in their own names
with the passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974. The law made credit card
companies issue cards to women without a husband’s signature, which gave more women
power over their personal finances.”).
4
See generally Gender Inequality and Women in the U.S. Labor Force,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, https://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/genderequality-in-the-workplace/WCMS_159496/lang--en/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/JH3SJPFQ] (last visited June 12, 2021).
5
Women in the Workforce, CATALYST: WORKPLACES THAT WORK FOR WOMEN (June
5,
2019),
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-in-the-workforce-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/T7GT-AJ5W].
6
Bridget Brennan, Top 10 Things Everyone Should Know About Women Consumers,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/company/stories/top-10-thingseveryone-know-women-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/EZ8Q-9NXV].
7
Women on Boards Gender Diversity Index: 2019 Progress of Women Corporate
Directors of Russell 3000 Index Companies by Company Size, State and Industry Sector,
2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS (2019), https://2020wob.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2020
WOB_Gender_Diversity_Index_Report_Oct2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZU5T-HJPL]
[hereinafter 2019 Women on Boards Gender Diversity Index] (reporting the progress of
women corporate directors of Russell 3000 index companies in 2019); see S.B. 826, 20172018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 § 1(e) (Cal. 2018) (outlining that in California, women hold
only 15.5% of the board seats and one-fourth of California-based companies have no female
directors).
8
S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 § 1(e) (Cal. 2018).
9
Id. § 2(a)–(b) (currently codified at CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3).
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reasoned that “[w]omen should have a seat at the table not just because it is the right
thing to do; it also makes good business sense. Bringing women into the boardroom
is good for employees, shareholders, and customers. When women lead, we all
benefit.”10
Ultimately, this Note contends that SB 826 is constitutional and a valuable
benefit to qualified female board candidates, shareholders of California-based
companies, and the United States economy as a whole. Part II of this Note considers
the evolution, results, and current status of California’s gender diversity mandate for
boards of directors. Part III discusses the constitutionality of SB 826 under the Equal
Protection Clause. This Note concludes that courts should uphold California’s
gender diversity mandate as a matter of law and public policy.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides a brief overview of the evolution, results, and current status
of California’s gender diversity mandate for boards of directors. The sections in this
Part will outline: (A) the state of corporate governance before the enactment of SB
826; (B) an overview of SB 826 requirements; (C) the benefits of a gender diversity
mandate; (D) the outcome after the SB 826 requirement deadline; and (E) the current
litigation over the mandate.
A. The State of Corporate Governance Before the Enactment of SB 826
SB 826 is the progeny of progressive California legislation dating back to
Senator Jackson’s Senate Concurrent Resolution 62,11 introduced in 2013, which
encouraged—but did not legally require—California-based companies to “increase
the number of women on their boards of directors” by December 31, 2016.12 In the
following years, numerous investors13 pressured companies to increase the number
of female directors—or, for many companies, to elect their first female.14 Investors
10
CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT ON WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON
CALIFORNIA CORPORATE BOARDS, CAL. PARTNERS PROJECT 19, http://www.insurance.ca.
gov/diversity/41-ISDGBD/GBDExternal/upload/CPP-WOB-Baseline-Report-2020-FINAL
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B558-A7EM] (last visited July 7, 2021) [hereinafter CLAIM YOUR
SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT] (quoting Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson).
11
S. Con. Res. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
12
S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 § 1(b) (Cal. 2018).
13
The three biggest asset managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—have
pressured companies with all male boards. Jess Green, After Adding More Women to Boards,
Companies Pivot to Race, FIN. PLAN. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.financialplanning.com/articles/blackrock-vanguard-state-street-pressured-companies-on-addingwomen-to-boards-now-to-focus-on-race [https://perma.cc/HPP4-2E2E].
14
CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 10 (citing BlackRock
Investment Stewardship, BLACKROCK (2020); Goldman Sachs’ Commitment to Board
Diversity, GOLDMAN SACHS (2020)) (“BlackRock recommends at least two women directors
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also placed significant importance on Environmental Social Governance (ESG)
factors, evaluating socially responsible investments alongside traditional financial
investments.15
Conscious and unconscious biases contribute to the glacial pace at which
females are represented on corporate boards.16 When choosing new directors, men
often do not “recognize the favoritism inherent in their choices of other white men”
because “[w]hen they comb their networks for people they can put forward (which
is how 87% of board seats are filled), they find few women executives in their own
circles.”17 Instead they often “claim the lack of gender parity . . . on their boards is
due to a lack of qualified women in the pipeline” instead of “a who-you-know
problem.”18 Unfortunately, male leaders often suffer from the bystander effect and
fail to take action themselves because they believe someone else will address the

serve on boards of companies in which it invests, and earlier this year Goldman Sachs
instituted a policy that requires diversity on the boards of companies that want its support to
go public.”); Joshua Schneiderman, California’s Gender Diversity on Boards Law and Its
Broader Implications for Public and Private Companies, SNELL & WILMER (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.swlaw.com/publications/legal-alerts/2587 [https://perma.cc/J3RW-S9TW].
15
See generally ESG 101: What Is ESG?, MORGAN STANLEY CAP. INT’L,
https://www.msci.com/what-is-esg [https://perma.cc/2TY7-49TB] (last visited June 6,
2021); see Christina Banahan & Gabriel Hasson, Across the Board Improvements: Gender
Diversity and ESG Performance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/06/across-the-board-improvements-gender-divers
ity-and-esg-performance/ [https://perma.cc/4C32-9EHF] (“Companies with diverse boards
receive higher scores on ESG performance metrics more often than those with non-diverse
boards.”).
16
Alfredo Enrione, Donna Finley & Gordon Allan, Leveraging the Value of Female
Directors, ETHICAL BOARDROOM, https://ethicalboardroom.com/leveraging-the-value-offemale-directors/ [https://perma.cc/3Z5F-FABC] (last visited June 6, 2021) (finding that
“biases – either conscious or unconscious – [] adversely affect[] the women’s perceived and
actual performance, and hence the overall effectiveness of the board.”).
17
Coco Brown, Why Men Still Dominate Corporate Boardrooms, FORTUNE (June 7,
2017, 1:35 PM), https://fortune.com/2017/06/07/most-powerful-women-career-advicecorporate-boardroom-diversity-workplace-inequality-favoritism/ [https://perma.cc/5PSW7LJP]; see Boris Groysberg & Deborah Bell, Dysfunction in the Boardroom, HARV. BUS.
REV. (June 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/06/dysfunction-in-the-boardroom [https://perma.cc/
ES3G-7W3T] (quoting a female director: “I’m not part of the old boys’ network.
Directorships go to people who are known. I’ve been so busy leading my company and
raising my family that I’m less well known.”); Sunitha Malepati, The Future (Public
Company Boardroom) Is Female: From California SB 826 to a Gender Diversity Listing
Standard, 28 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 493, 503 (2020) (“When a seat opens,
companies prioritize prior board experience in the election of new directors and find
candidates from within current board members' largely male-dominated networks.”).
18
Brown, supra note 17.
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problem.19 As a result, board seats continuously go to older, white men20 who
comprise only a minority of employees, customers, or shareholders.
Women also face “structural barriers and discrimination in the workplace,
hindering their ability to reach leadership positions” to be considered for board
duties.21 For example, there is a strong correlation between the gender of a
company’s CEO and the gender diversity of its board of directors.22 Female CEOs
have an average of 30% women on their boards while male CEOs have an average
of 17.3% women on their boards.23 Male CEOs are also much less likely than their
female counterparts to lead companies with gender-diverse boards.24 However,
because women only account for thirty-seven out of 500 CEOs for Fortune 500
companies,25 women have fewer leadership opportunities to increase gender
diversity on boards. Additionally, studies suggest that women need to be more
qualified than men to become a board member and pay a higher personal price;
compared to their male counterparts, “fewer female directors were married and had
children” and a “larger percentage of the women were divorced.”26 Moreover, even
if companies elect women to the board, female directors are often treated as diversity
tokens with less influence in substantive deliberations and serve mainly as façades.27
19

See id.
Jena McGregor, Corporate Boards Are Still Mostly White, Mostly Male — and
Getting Even Older, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018, 8:39 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/on-leadership/wp/2018/04/24/corporate-boards-are-still-mostly-white-mostlymale-and-getting-even-older/ [https://perma.cc/WWQ9-YRG6] (stating that in 2018,
“[d]irectors younger than 50 ma[d]e up [six] percent of the seats on S&P 500 boards — drop
the age to 45, and it’s less than [two] percent. There [we]re more directors 75 or older than
those 50 or younger.”); Groysberg & Bell, supra note 17 (quoting a female director: “Boards
still prefer pale, stale, and male!”).
21
Malepati, supra note 17; see Deborah D. Zelechowski & Diana Bilimoria,
Characteristics of Women and Men Corporate Inside Directors in the US, 12 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 337, 341 (2004) (explaining the “pipeline theory”: “there are simply too few
women in lower ranks qualified to ascend to the top corporate job.”).
22
Board Room Diversity: When Women Lead, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, 2 (2016),
https://2020wob.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2020GDI-2016Report.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/TNE3-KUW7] (reporting the progress of women corporate directors of Fortune 1000
companies in 2020).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Emma Hinchliffe, The Number of Female CEOs in the Fortune 500 Hits an All-Time
Record, FORTUNE (May 18, 2020, 5:15 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/05/18/women-ceosfortune-500-2020/#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20women%20running,are%20led%20
by%20female%20CEOs [https://perma.cc/6MHD-L6NB].
26
Groysberg & Bell, supra note 17.
27
Zelechowski & Bilimoria, supra note 21, at 341 (“[W]omen may be treated as tokens:
peripheral members having less personal influence in deliberations within the executive suite
and the boardroom.”); Groysberg & Bell, supra note 17 (“Why aren’t more women on boards?
One female director offered this explanation: ‘Women are not thought of first as candidates
unless a board is looking for gender diversity specifically.’”).
20
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Before California enacted SB 826, “29% of public companies headquartered in
California had zero female corporate board directors.”28 Consequently, if women’s
growth in workplace leadership were to remain at its current pace, then it would take
decades (after most professional women currently in the workforce retire) for
companies nationwide to reach gender equality without legally enforceable
requirements.29
B. Overview of SB 826 Requirements
SB 826 was established when Senator Jackson took the push to change gender
diversity in the boardroom from an encouragement to a requirement under California
state law in 2018.30 When Governor Brown signed SB 826 into law,31 California
became the first state32 to require boards to include female directors.33 SB 826 states
28

CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 10 (citing The Women
Changing California Boardrooms, KPMG (2020)).
29
S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 § 1(f) (Cal. 2018); see also id. § 1(f)(1)
(“A 2015 study conducted by the United States Government Accountability Office estimated
that it could take more than 40 years for the numbers of women on boards to match men.”).
30
S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 (Cal. 2018).
31
Section 2 of SB 826 is codified at Section 301.3 of the California Corporations Code.
See S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 § 2 (Cal. 2018); CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3
(Deering 2018).
32
But see Michael Hatcher & Weldon Latham, States Are Leading the Charge to
Corporate Boards: Diversify!, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, (May 12, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/12/states-are-leading-the-charge-to-corporateboards-diversify/ [https://perma.cc/3JXX-NKDC] (“At least 11 other states have enacted or
are considering board diversity legislation. None of the other existing statutes mandate
minimum numbers of female directors; instead, those statutes focus on disclosures about
diversity on the board of directors, and in some instances, senior management. Many of the
enacted bills were originally modeled on the California gender diversity mandates, but were
changed to ‘disclosure only’ during the legislative process.”).
33
Daniel Greene, Vincent J. Intintoli & Kathleen M. Kahle, Do Board Gender Quotas
Affect Firm Value? Evidence from California Senate Bill No. 826, 60 J. OF CORP. FIN. 1, 1
(2020). Additionally, on September 30, 2020, Governor Newsom signed AB 979 into law
which lawmakers designed after SB 826. In response to the social unrest in the United States
over systemic racial equality, AB 979 requires that publicly held corporations whose
principal executive office are located in California must have at least one director from an
“underrepresented community” by the end of 2021. Additionally, by the end of 2022, these
corporations with more than four directors must have a minimum of two directors from
“underrepresented communities” and corporations with nine or more directors must have a
minimum of three directors from “underrepresented communities.” A director from an
“‘underrepresented community’ means an individual who self-identifies as Black, African
American, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or
Alaska Native, or who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender.” Just like
California’s gender diversity mandate, California is the first state to establish a mandate for
“underrepresented communities” on corporate boards. Assemb. B. 979, 2019-2020 Gen.
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that “a publicly held . . . corporation whose principal executive offices . . . are located
in California34 shall have a minimum of one female director on its board” by the end
of 2019.35 Additionally, by the end of 2021, corporations with five directors “shall
have a minimum of two female directors,”36 and corporations with six or more
directors “shall have a minimum of three female directors.”37 A corporation is
subject to the requirements of Section 301.3 if the corporation is “publicly held,”
meaning that it has “shares listed on a major United States stock exchange.”38
SB 826 defines ‘female’ as “an individual who self-identifies her gender as a
woman, without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth,”39 meaning that
SB 826 is mandated based on gender rather than sex and is inclusive of transgender
women.40 Notably, to comply with Section 301.3, any “corporation may increase the
number of directors on its board,” rather than replace existing board members,
meaning that the gender requirement includes women in addition to, not instead of,
male directors.41 As long as a female holds a board position “for at least a portion of
the year,” a corporation will not violate Section 301.3.42 Corporations that fail to
comply with the requirement are subject to a $100,000 fine for a first violation and
$300,000 for any subsequent violations.43
Assemb., Reg. Sess., Ch. 316 (Cal. 2020) (currently codified at CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.4);
Cydney Posner, California Mandates Board Diversity for “Underrepresented
Communities,” COOLEY PUBCO (Oct. 1, 2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/10/01/califor
nia-mandates-board-diversity-underrepresented-communities/
[https://perma.cc/RAA67FRV]; but see Jacqueline Concilla, A Glimmer of Hope for California’s “Well-Intentioned”
Attempt to Put More Women in the Boardroom, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 628 (2020) (“SB
826, a program that would clearly be unacceptable in the race context, is permissible as a
gender-based classification.”).
34
Six hundred two companies—over 12% of all public U.S. companies—“are
headquartered in California, so the mandate affects a large and diverse set of firms with a
combined market capitalization of over $5 trillion.” Greene et al., supra note 33, at 2.
35
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (Deering 2018); see id. § 301.3(f)(2) (explaining that a
corporation is considered publicly held if it has “shares listed on a major United States stock
exchange”).
36
Id. § 301.3(b)(2).
37
Id. § 301.3(b)(1).
38
Id. § 301.3(f)(2).
39
Id. § 301.3(f)(1).
40
Definitions, TRANS STUDENT EDUC. RES., http://www.transstudent.org/definitions/
[https://perma.cc/DQT9-2ABK] (last visited June 16, 2021) (defining transgender as “[a]n
umbrella term for people whose gender identity differs from the sex they were assigned at
birth”).
41
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (Deering 2018).
42
Id. § 301.3(e)(3).
43
Id. § 301.3(e)(1)(B-C). But see Cydney Posner, New Report Looks at Board Gender
Diversity in California, COOLEY PUBCO (Oct. 15, 2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/10
/15/report-board-gender-diversity-california/#page=1
[https://perma.cc/YR26-Y763]
(“Note that, although fines are authorized under SB 826 for violations of the law, no
regulations have yet been adopted to implement fines.”); see generally John N. Oest,
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C. Benefits of a Gender Diversity Mandate
When Senator Jackson introduced SB 826 to the California Legislature, she
argued that a gender diversity requirement would “boost the California economy,
improve opportunities for women in the workplace, and protect California taxpayers,
shareholders, and retirees . . . .”44 Such gender-diverse boards significantly increase
company value.45 Based on a report by Credit Suisse, which examined over 2,000
global companies for six years, companies with women on their boards had a net
income growth four percent higher than companies with no female directors46 and
“outperformed shares of comparable businesses with all-male boards by 26%.”47
Additionally, a five-year study found that companies “with three or more female
directors reported earnings per share that were 45% higher than those companies
with no female directors at the beginning of the period.”48
Companies with female boards of directors are more profitable because women
bring a “greater diversity of viewpoints,” to an otherwise all male board, which
improves the “quality of board deliberations . . . because different perspectives can
increase the amount of information available.”49 Additionally, female directors are
more likely to push the CEO to consider a broader range of options when making
Negotiating the Loan Agreement: The Borrower’s Perspective, Part II, AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N (May 31, 2011), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt
/2011/05/03_oest/ [https://perma.cc/9QXE-YQW7] (explaining that corporations are
required to disclose non-compliance with laws to investors, which is an equally motivating
factor for companies to comply with SB 826).
44
S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 § 1(a) (Cal. 2018).
45
See Greene et al., supra note 33, at 3 (first citing Ronald C. Anderson, David M.
Reeb, Arun Upadhyay & Wanli Zhao, The Economics of Director Heterogeneity, 40 FIN.
MGMT. (2011); then citing Gennaro Bernile, Vineet Bhagwat & Scottt Yonker, Board
Diversity, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies, 127 J. FIN. ECON. 588 (2018)); MARY CURTIS,
CHRISTINE SCHMID & MARION STRUBER, CREDIT SUISSE RSCH. INST., GENDER DIVERSITY
AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE (Aug. 2012).
46
CURTIS ET AL., supra note 45.
47
CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 10 (citing CURTIS ET AL., supra
note 45).
48
S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 § 1(c)(1) (Cal. 2018). But see Jena
McGregor, After Years of ‘Glacial’ Change, Women Now Hold More Than 1 in 4 Corporate
Board Seats, WASH. POST (July 17, 2019, 9:01 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/bus
iness/2019/07/17/after-years-glacial-change-women-now-hold-more-than-corporate-boardseats/ [https://perma.cc/MB4N-CMT9] (explaining that “other explanations [for company
success] could be at play: Good financial outcomes could prompt boards to be more
concerned about social norms and garner more resources to then hire more female
directors.”).
49
Jie Chen, Woon Sau Leung, Wei Song & Marc Goergen, Research: When Women
Are on Boards, Male CEOs Are Less Overconfident, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/09/research-when-women-are-on-boards-male-ceos-are-less-overconfi
dent#:~:text=Women%2C%20on%20average%2C%20made%20up,the%20CEOs%20in%
20our%20sample.&text=In%20other%20words%2C%20male%20CEOs,when%20exercisi
ng%20would%20yield%20profits [https://perma.cc/GP5V-V5JF].
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business decisions because female directors “tend to be less conformist and more
likely to express their independent views than male directors because they do not
belong to old-boy networks.”50 Female directors’ diverse viewpoints also help
companies manage risk effectively and balance long-term priorities.51 For example,
during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, “female board representation reduced the
negative impact of the crisis . . . because CEOs of firms with female board
representation were less likely to adopt aggressive strategies that made their firms more
vulnerable to the crisis.”52 On the other hand, companies “that did not have female
board representation suffered a greater drop in performance.”53
In addition to increasing profits, gender diversity on boards benefits companies
in non-monetary ways, like attracting talented workers, increasing customers, and
benefiting female employees. Generation Z and Millennials—the largest generations
in the workforce54—care about diversity and seek work with new and innovative
leaders.55 Similarly, female directors help companies “meet the expectations of their
customers in a world where customers increasingly ‘shop their values.’”56 For
example, sustainability is an influential factor for many consumers,57 and
“companies with women on their boards are more likely to ‘create a sustainable
future’ by . . . instituting strong governance structures with a high level of
transparency.”58 In addition to benefitting companies, gender diversity mandates are

50

Id.
CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 10 (citing Banahan & Hasson,
supra note 15).
52
Chen et al., supra note 49.
53
Id. (examining how female board members affect company performance, researchers
“looked at differences in accounting and stock performance for 516 firms during the financial
crisis of 2007 to 2009.”).
54
CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 10 (citing Millennials Are the
Largest Generation in the U.S. Labor Force, PEW RSCH. CTR. (2018)).
55
Id. (citing The Millennial Majority Is Transforming Your Culture, DELOITTE UNIV.
(2015)).
56
Id. (citing All In: How Inclusion and Diversity Drive Shoppers’ Behavior,
ACCENTURE RSCH (2019)).
57
Tensie Whelan & Randi Kronthal-Sacco, Research: Actually, Consumers Do Buy
Sustainable Products, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 19, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/06/researchactually-consumers-do-buy-sustainable-products
[https://perma.cc/Y5PU-SPRC]
(“[P]roducts marketed as sustainable grew 5.6 times faster than those that were not. In more
than 90% of the CPG categories, sustainability-marketed products grew faster than their
conventional counterparts.”).
58
CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 10 (citing KELLIE A.
MCELHANEY & SANAZ MOBASSERI, UC BERKELEY HAAS SCH. OF BUS., WOMEN CREATE A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2012)).
51
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also beneficial to female workers. Gender diversity on boards results in “lower pay
gap[s] between male and female executives”59 and reduces gender segregation in the
workplace.60
D. Outcome After SB 826 Requirement Deadline
The rollout of SB 826 was largely successful in bringing women to the
corporate table. At the beginning of 2019, about one-third of California-based
companies had all-male boards and needed to add at least one female director by
202061 (meaning that “1,275 women needed to be added to public company boards
in California.”).62 Moreover, to meet the additional requirements by 2022, more than
88% of California-based companies needed to add one or more female directors in
the next three years.63 However, after the SB 826 deadline, the number of companies
with all-male boards dropped from 183 companies to fifteen (just three percent of
all public companies with principal executive offices in California).64 As a result,
97% of the 625 “impacted corporations” comply with SB 826.65
Although the number of women added to boards of public companies with
principal offices in California has naturally increased over the years (87 women
added in 2016, 121 women in 2017, and 176 women in 2018), after California signed
SB 826 into law, the number of women added to boards almost doubled from 2018
with 346 new women added in 2019.66 Without a mandatory requirement for female
directors, it is unlikely that these same companies would have promoted women to
59

Greene et al., supra note 33, at 3 (citing Mary Ellen Carter, Francesca Franco &
Mireia Gine, Executive Gender Pay Gaps: The Roles of Female Risk Aversion and Board
Representation, 34 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 1232 (2017)); see Alison Cook, Alicia R
Ingersoll & Christy Glass, Gender Gaps at the Top: Does Board Composition Affect
Executive Compensation?, 72 HUM. REL. 1292, 1296 (2018) (“[W]omen’s service on the
board is likely to have direct and indirect benefits for compensation equity between women
and men executives.”).
60
Cook et al., supra note 59.
61
Mikayla Kuhns, Rudy Kwack & Kosmas Papadopoulos, California Dreamin’: The
Impact of the New Board Gender Diversity Law, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG: COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL’S BLOG ON CORPORATIONS AND THE CAPITAL MARKETS (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/04/california-dreamin-the-impact-of-the-newboard-gender-diversity-law/ [https://perma.cc/3TLT-7TH9].
62
CAL. PARTNERS PROJECT, GENDER EQUITY: INCREASE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN
ON CORPORATE BOARDS, https://www.calpartnersproject.org/justthefacts [https://perma.cc
/V3UW-4E9R] (last visited June 6, 2021).
63
Id.; Greene et al., note 33, at 2 (explaining that California companies will need to add
over 1,000 additional female directors by 2021).
64
Posner, supra note 43 (citing CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT, supra note
10).
65
See id.; ALEX PADILLA, SEC’Y OF STATE, WOMEN ON BOARDS: MARCH 2020 REPORT
CORPORATIONS CODE SECTION 301.3, (Mar. 2020), https://bpd.cdn.sos.ca.gov/women-onboards/WOB-Report-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LFD-3P8M].
66
Posner, supra note 43.
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boards at the same rate. In total, women gained 42% of the new board seats for
Russell 3000 Index companies in 2019.67 SB 826’s 2019 requirement is responsible
for some of the increase in female directors in 2019.68 However, in the first six
months of 2020, only 147 women69 had been added to boards, meaning women only
gained 36% of the new seats for Russell 3000 Index companies, down from 42% in
2019.70 This decline is likely because the next deadline for SB 826 is not until the
end of 2021.71 This could indicate that companies are less willing to add women to
their board voluntarily, suggesting that a mandatory requirement for female directors
is vital if the United States is to achieve gender parity sometime before the year
2055.72
Of the 5,225 total board seats at all public companies with principal executive
offices in California, “766 were held by women in 2018, while 1,275 were held by
women in June 2020—an increase of 66.5%.”73 Now, 97% of public companies in
California have at least one woman director on their board.74 Additionally, in 2020,
California had 349 companies with 20% or more board seats held by women—3.6%
more companies than the prior year and more than any other state.75 Consequently,
women now hold 22.6% of board seats76 nationwide, increasing from 17.7% in 2018.
However, even after California’s mandatory gender diversity requirement,
female directors only make up 22.6% of the director positions in the country, a
dismal percentage given that women make up 57.4% of the United States labor

67

20% BY 2020, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 3 (2020),
https://2020wob.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/2020-GDI-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ZNZ9-QHJC] [hereinafter 2020 PROGRESS OF WOMEN CORPORATE DIRECTORS] (reporting
the progress of women corporate directors of Russell 3000 index companies in 2020).
68
Id. (noting that “California, which passed the historic Women on Boards law in 2018
has the greatest number of W companies and saw the biggest increase of women directors”
in 2019).
69
Posner, supra note 43.
70
2020 PROGRESS OF WOMEN CORPORATE DIRECTORS, supra note 67.
71
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(b) (Deering 2018) (stating that corporations with five
directors “shall have a minimum of two female directors” and, corporations with six or more
directors “shall have a minimum of three female directors”).
72
S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 954 § 1(f)(2) (Cal. 2018); see also id. §
1(f)(1) (“A 2015 study conducted by the United States Government Accountability Office
estimated that it could take more than 40 years for the numbers of women on boards to match
men.”).
73
Posner, supra note 43 (citing CLAIM YOUR SEAT: A PROGRESS REPORT, supra note
10); see also Greene et al., supra note 33, at 2 (“The aggregate number of board seats held
by female directors increase[d] by 23% (143 board seats) from pre- to post-SB 826.”).
74
GENDER EQUITY: INCREASE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS,
supra note 62.
75
2020 PROGRESS OF WOMEN CORPORATE DIRECTORS, supra note 67.
76
Id.; see also 2019 Women on Boards Gender Diversity Index, supra note 7, at 2
(reporting the progress of women corporate directors of Russell 3000 index companies in
2019 and 2020).
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force.77 Moreover, women drive 70–80% of consumer purchasing and should be
represented in a company’s leadership because “companies with gender-balanced
teams have a higher ROI.”78 Nonetheless, SB 826 will continue to decrease the
gender gap on corporate boards. To comply with SB 826’s requirement for the end
of 2021, “467 companies (71.8%) need one or more women to join their boards by
the end of 2021 to meet the gender requirement of SB 826.”79
E. Current Litigation over the Mandate
Governor Brown’s signing of SB 826 into law was not without controversy. He
acknowledged that “serious legal concerns ha[d] been raised” about the gender
diversity mandate but, “[g]iven all the special privileges that corporations have
enjoyed for so long,” he argued that it was “high time corporate boards include the
people who constitute more than half the ‘persons’ in America.”80 Subsequently,
legal scholars anticipated a flood of lawsuits challenging SB 826.81 Despite legal
scholars’ expectations, the vast majority of companies appear to have accepted SB
826 and have not filed suit, perhaps to prevent public scrutiny or perhaps from
“feeling the pressure from large asset managers . . . .”82 Yet, two conservative legal
organizations, each challenging on separate grounds, filed lawsuits challenging SB
826.83
The first of these groups, Judicial Watch, filed Crest v. Padilla to prevent
California from spending taxpayer money on SB 826 in August 2019.84 The
plaintiffs claim SB 826 violates the California Constitution because the
“legislation’s quota system for female representation on corporate boards employs
express gender classifications” and, as a result, is subject to strict scrutiny review,
which cannot be justified by a narrowly tailored compelling governmental interest.85
In response, the defendant—California Secretary of State Alex Padilla—filed a
demurrer, arguing that the plaintiffs do not have standing and the action is not ripe
because it is “sheer guesswork” that a corporation will fail to comply with SB 826
77

Women in the Workforce, supra note 5.
Brennan, supra note 6.
79
GENDER EQUITY: INCREASE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS,
supra note 62.
80
Cydney Posner, California Mandates Quotas for Board Gender Diversity—Will It
Fuel a Movement?, COOLEY PUBCO (Sept. 30, 2018), https://cooleypubco.com/2018/09/30/
california-mandates-quotas-for-board-gender-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/X58T-U44V].
81
Cydney Posner, Federal District Court Dismisses a Challenge to California Board
Gender Diversity Statute, COOLEY PUBCO (Apr. 21, 2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/
04/21/court-dismisses-challenge-to-sb-826/ [https://perma.cc/486R-X6YK] [hereinafter
Posner, California Board Gender Diversity Statute].
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Amended Complaint at 1, Crest v. Padilla, Superior Court of the State of California,
County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 19STCV27561 (filed Sept. 20, 2019).
85
Id. at 4.
78
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and have to pay a fine.86 A jury trial is set for October 25, 2021. Until then, it is
unknown how a court will rule on the constitutionality of SB 826.87
Pacific Legal Foundation, the second of the two conservative legal
organizations to challenge SB 826, filed Meland v. Padilla in November 2019,
arguing that SB 826 violates the Equal Protection Clause.88 When Pacific Legal
Foundation filed the complaint, the company it represented, OSI Systems, Inc., had
no women on their board.89 The plaintiff—a shareholder of OSI Systems—argued
that SB 826 injures his “right to vote for the candidate of his choice” and forces
“shareholders to perpetuate sex-based discrimination.”90 The plaintiff also argued
that SB 826 facially discriminates based on sex without serving an “important
government interest” and that the statute relies on “improper gender stereotypes,
such as the belief that women board members bring a particular ‘working style’
which will impact corporate governance.”91 The judge dismissed the Pacific Legal
Foundation’s complaint based on a lack of standing and concluded that the injury is
only hypothetical, reasoning that if the plaintiff “prefers a male board member
nominee, there is nothing in SB 826 preventing him from casting a vote in favor of
that nominee.”92 The plaintiff filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.93 Consequently,
the constitutionality of SB 826 has yet to be determined by a court.
III. ANALYSIS
In this Part, section (A) argues that SB 826 is constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause because gender classification is subject to intermediate scrutiny,
and SB 826 is not a strict quota that excludes men from board positions. Next,
section (B) argues that if states ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), the
gender diversity mandate of SB 826 would likely be an unconstitutional violation of
the Equal Protection Clause because the ERA’s ratification will likely change the
standard of review for gender classifications from intermediate scrutiny to strict
scrutiny.

86

Keith Paul Bishop, Secretary of State Declares Enforcement of Gender Quota Law
to be “Entirely Speculative” and Casts Doubt on Rulemaking, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 12,
2019) https://www.natlawreview.com/article/secretary-state-declares-enforcement-genderquota-law-to-be-entirely-speculative-and [https://perma.cc/MU9H-S233].
87
Crest Docket, Case No. BC 19STCV27561; Keith Paul Bishop, First Legal Test of
Female Board Quota Law Will be on Monday, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/first-legal-test-female-board-quota-law-will-bemonday [https://perma.cc/XDC3-279C].
88
Complaint at 6, Medland v. Padilla, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69114 (E.D. Cal. Apr.
20, 2020) (No. 2:19-cv-02288-JAM-AC).
89
Posner, California Board Gender Diversity Statute, supra note 81.
90
Complaint, supra note 88, at 5.
91
Id. at 6.
92
Id. at 11.
93
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Meland v. Padilla, No. 20-15762 (9th Cir. 2020).
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A. SB 826 Is Constitutional Under the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutionality of SB 826 depends on whether the gender classification is
subject to intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny. This Note argues SB 826 is a
constitutional gender classification under intermediate scrutiny. The challenges
lodged against SB 826 do so on the grounds established in the Equal Protection
Clause. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal
protection of the laws.”94 To determine whether a government action is
constitutional, courts subject potential Equal Protection violations to three levels of
scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. Strict
scrutiny applies when the government facially discriminates against a suspect class
(such as race).95 For the law to be upheld under strict scrutiny, the government must
prove that the classification is necessary to promote a compelling purpose.96
Additionally, the government’s law must be the least restrictive means of achieving
the purpose.97 On the other hand, intermediate scrutiny occurs “when a law
discriminates based on a quasi-suspect classification” such as sex.98 For the law to
be upheld under intermediate scrutiny, the government’s classification must be
substantially related to an important purpose.99 Lastly, when no suspect class is
involved (discrimination based on disability, age, wealth, etc.), courts apply a
rational basis test. For the law to be upheld under rational basis review, the
government’s classification only needs to be rationally related to a legitimate
purpose (the law’s actual purpose or hypothetical purpose is sufficient to meet this
standard).100
The plaintiffs in Crest v. Padilla argued that the appropriate standard of review
for SB 826 is strict scrutiny on the basis that the law requires a quota of women to
occupy board seats.101 A quota occurs when “a certain fixed number or proportion
of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.’”102 Under the
94

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
96
United States v. Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1003 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976), the Court declared a statute that allowed
women to buy low level alcohol at 18 but prohibited men from buying the same alcohol until
21 a denial of equal protection of the laws. The Court reasoned that, although traffic safety
is an important purpose, the distinction in gender was not substantially related to the
objective because only 2% of men drink and drive. Id. at 199. In United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 557–58, (1996), the Court invalidated a program that an all-male military
program proposed for women at a different college because Virginia had not shown that it
established the school with a goal of diversifying educational approaches. Id. at 539.
100
Id.
101
Amended Complaint at 1, Crest v. Padilla, Superior Court of the State of California,
County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 19STCV27561 (filed Sept. 20, 2019).
102
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
95
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Equal Protection Clause, classifications of race and gender receive different levels
of scrutiny. Race-based quotas are subject to a strict scrutiny analysis103 and, if not
narrowly tailed for a compelling government purpose, are unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause.104 For example, in Regents University of California v.
Bakke, the court held that a quota-based system that reserved 16 of the 100 special
admissions positions for racial minority applicants to the medical school was an
unconstitutional quota.105
On the other hand, in Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court agreed that
intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of review for gender classifications.106
The Supreme Court established that “[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, . . .
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”107 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed Craig and applied intermediate scrutiny in United States v. Virginia, by
stating “[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”108
103

Anisa A. Somani, The Use of Gender Quotas in America: Are Voluntary Party
Quotas the Way to Go?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1451, 1474 (2013).
104
Creighton R. Meland, Jr., Should Courts Uphold Corporate Board Diversity
Statutes?, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 15, 27 (2019) (“The Gratz Court invalidated the University
of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program that awarded points for minority status.”);
see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (stating that a quota occurs when a fixed number is reserved for
certain minority groups).
105
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
106
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (creating the intermediate scrutiny test to provide a
standard of review less rigorous than strict scrutiny but stricter than rational basis review).
Until 1976, the Supreme Court applied the rational basis test to gender discrimination. In
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that sex
discrimination is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection clause. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the brief for the appellant in Reed and argued that
“discrimination grounded on sex, for purposes unrelated to any biological difference between
the sexes, ranks with legislative discrimination based on race, another congenital, unalterable
trait of birth, and merits no greater judicial deference.” Brief for Appellant at 5, Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (No. 70-4). However, the Court rejected her argument for strict scrutiny and applied
rational basis review. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
107
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
108
518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). However, in a footnote in United States v. Virginia,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[t]he Court has thus far reserved [strict] scrutiny for
classifications based on race or national origin.” Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 n.6. Justice Scalia
and other legal scholars suggest that Justice Ginsburg predicts, and invites, future changes to
the standard of review for sex-based discrimination. Id. at 574 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 532 n.6 (majority opinion)) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bridget L. Murphy, The Equal Rights
Amendment Revisited, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 937, 950 (2018). Ruth Bader Ginsburg has
been a longtime advocate for applying strict scrutiny to gender-based discrimination. In her
brief for the appellant in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), Ruth Bader Ginsburg devoted 46
pages to arguing for the court to adopt a strict scrutiny analysis and only seven pages for her
fallback argument of rational basis review. Murphy, supra at 949 n.68 (citing Brief for
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Although the Court has yet to rule directly on gender quotas, the court has not
“closed the door to gender parity,”109 which means that a “gender based affirmative
action measure may survive constitutional challenge when a race-based program
may not.”110 The Supreme Court “has indicated that gender classifications benefiting
women will be allowed when they are designated to remedy past discrimination or
differences in opportunity.”111 For example, the Bakke Court contrasted
unconstitutional racial quotas with gender quotas by stating, “[g]ender-based
distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and practical problems present in
preferential programs premised on racial and ethnic criteria,” 112 thus meriting only
the lower intermediate scrutiny when challenged. Again, in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, the Supreme Court upheld a quota-like gender diversity
affirmative action plan which granted promotion preference to a woman, reasoning
that the program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because sex was only
“taken into account for the purpose of remedying underrepresentation.”113 The Court
further reasoned that the “affirmative action plan . . . represents a moderate, flexible,
case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation
of . . . women in the . . . work force.”114 Overall, the intermediate standard of review
“for sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause has been applied
repeatedly and is increasingly viewed as a settled question.”115 As such, “the Court
has shown a greater tolerance for sex-based action, articulating a need to protect
women or acknowledge gendered differences.”116
Critics of the Supreme Court’s tolerance for sex-based discrimination argue
that affirmative action programs for women rest on the “condescending belief that
Appellant at 5, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (No. 70-4)). Ironically, the application of strict scrutiny to
gender classifications would likely make affirmative action efforts like SB 826
unconstitutional—as discussed in more detail in Part III.B.
109
Tracy A. Thomas, Reconsidering the Remedy of Gender Quotas, 40 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER ONLINE 1, 20 (2016).
110
Somani, supra note 10, at 1474103.
111
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 798 (5th
ed. 2015); See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (holding that sex
classifications are an appropriate goal to “redress[] our society’s longstanding disparate
treatment of women.”) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977)).
112
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302–03 (1978) (explaining that
gender-based classification create less problems than racial classifications because “there are
only two possible classifications . . . . There are no rival groups which can claim that they,
too, are entitled to preferential treatment. Classwide questions as to the group suffering
previous injury and groups which fairly can be burdened are relatively manageable for
reviewing courts.” However, racial-based classifications present more problems because
“the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic
history that gender-based classifications do not share.”).
113
480 U.S. 616, 634 (1987).
114
Id. at 642.
115
Martha F. Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then and Now, 17 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 419, 431 (2008).
116
Thomas, supra note 109, at 17109.
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women aren’t capable of getting into the boardroom unless the government opens
the door for them.”117 However, SB 826 does not question whether women are
capable of getting into the boardroom; rather, it ensures that women have an
opportunity to earn a spot at the table.
SB 826 is almost certainly constitutional not only because it is subject to the
lesser intermediate scrutiny but also because the female requirement is not a fixed
and rigid quota system that excludes men from current or future board positions.118
Unlike Bakke, which reserves a set number of positions for racial minorities,119 SB
826 does not limit the number of positions available for boards. SB 826 states that
any “corporation may increase the number of directors on its board to comply with”
Section 301.3.120 Thus, the gender requirement includes women in board
representation in addition to, not instead of, male directors. In fact, since the passage
of SB 826, “[60%] of the women in board positions took the job when new seats
were created by expanding boards, not by replacing male directors.”121 This
demonstrates that SB 826 does not employ an unconstitutional quota-based system.

117

California’s “Woman Quota” Targeted in New Lawsuit, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Nov.
13, 2019), https://pacificlegal.org/press-release/californias-woman-quota-targeted-in-newlawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/B6WP-LAEF] (quoting Anastasia Boden, a senior attorney at
Pacific Legal Foundation, a nonprofit organization representing the plaintiff in Meland).
118
But see Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17, 485 P.2d 529, 539 (1971)
(invalidating a law that excluded most women from bartending because the state equal
protection clause “compels the application of the strict scrutiny standard of review, first,
because the statute limits the fundamental right of one class of persons to pursue a lawful
profession, and, second, because classifications based upon sex should be treated as
suspect”).
119
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
120
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (Deering 2018).
121
Anne Stych, Women’s Representation on Boards Reaches a Milestone, BIZWOMEN
(Sept. 12, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/latestnews/2019/09/womens-representation-on-boards-reaches-a.html?page=all [https://perma.cc
/XYC2-39RG]; see also Greene et al., supra note 33, at 3 (“Of the 136 firms that add a female
director, 40% replace male directors while 60% expand the board.”); 2020 PROGRESS OF
WOMEN CORPORATE DIRECTORS, supra note 67 (“Sixty percent of the seats gained by
women were additional board seats and did not require men to give up their seats to make
room for women.”); Martha Groves, How California’s ‘Woman Quota’ Is Already Changing
Corporate Boards, CALMATTERS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://calmatters.org/economy/2019/12/
california-woman-quota-corporate-board-gender-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/7UDZ-SEC3]
(reporting that Skechers named “Katherine Blair . . . as its first female director . . . br[inging]
the nine-member board to 10”).
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Notably, SB 826’s classification is based on gender identity122 rather than sex123
because, under the code, a female board member is an individual who self-identifies
as a woman, regardless of the individual’s designated sex at birth.124 Accordingly,
SB 826 is inclusive of transgender125 people and is mandated based on gender rather
than sex.126 Section 301.3’s definition of female is not beneficial towards only
persons of the female sex because it does not prohibit persons of the male sex from
fulfilling the gender diversity requirements. A person physically born of the male
sex can still fulfill SB 826’s gender requirement if they self-identify with the female
gender. Thus, the gender-inclusive language of SB 826 “circumvent[s] the argument
that the law is beneficial toward only one protected class of persons, people of the
female sex.”127 Consequently, the gender diversity requirement of SB 826 does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because it does not facial identify who the law
applies to using an explicit facial classification, like race or sex.128
To pass constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny, SB 826’s gender
classification needs to be “substantially related to a sufficiently important
governmental interest.”129 Previous courts have found that sex classifications may
be constitutionally used to: (1) compensate women “for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered,”130 (2) to “promote[] equal employment
opportunity,”131 and (3) “to advance full development of the talent and capacities of
our Nation’s people.”132 However, sex classifications may not be used “to create or
122

Understanding Gender, GENDER SPECTRUM, https://www.genderspectrum.org/art
icles/understanding-gender [https://perma.cc/44DR-UZLB] (last visited June 6, 2021)
(“Gender identity is our internal experience and naming of our gender. It can correspond to
or differ from the sex we were assigned at birth.”).
123
In the 1970s, when the Court was deciding the controlling case—like Johnson and
Webster—on gender classifications that benefit women, the Court used the terms gender and
sex interchangeably. In 2021, most people refer to sex and gender as two distinct things. Sex
refers to the sex someone was assigned at birth whereas gender refers to someone’s internal
identity.
124
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(f)(1) (Deering 2018).
125
TRANS STUDENT EDUC. RES., supra note 40.
126
Teal N. Trujillo, Do We Need to Secure a Place at the Table for Women? An Analysis
of the Legality of California Law SB-826, 45 J. LEGIS. 324, 328 (2018); Jessica A. Clarke,
They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 953 (2019) (“The recognition that some
people’s genders are not binary does not render unadministrable laws that would require, for
example, that corporate boards include one or more self-identified women.”).
127
Trujillo, supra note 126, at 328.
128
The Supreme Court has not yet broadened the definition of “sex” to include new
categories that are beyond the facial female/male binary. Even in Bostock v. Clayton
County—where the Court held that an employer cannot discriminate against an employee for
being transgender—the Court stated that “sex” “refer[s] only to biological distinctions
between male and female.” 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
129
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
130
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977).
131
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987).
132
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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perpetuate legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”133 In this case, SB 826
is substantially related to the vital governmental interests of “women’s nonrepresentative lack of power, continued subordination, lack of autonomy, . . . equity,
proportional representation, and balanced power . . . .”134 Similar to Califano v.
Webster, SB 826 is substantially related to the important governmental interest of
“redressing our society’s longstanding disparate treatment of women.”135
Additionally, SB 826 is a vital government interest because, as discussed in Part
II.C, corporations with diverse gendered leadership are more profitable for the
economy.
California’s previous legislation (Senate Concurrent Resolution 62) was not
mandatory and had no enforceable consequences, and, as a result, fewer than 20%
of California-based companies implemented “the minimum number of women
directors” called for in the resolution.136 Thus, SB 826’s mandatory requirements
and enforceable consequences are substantially related to the important
governmental interest of allowing businesses to conduct themselves as they see fit
while achieving gender parity—an outcome that SCR 62’s voluntary goals could not
achieve. Another way in which SB 826 substantially relates to governmental
interests is that it requires that corporations have a female director only “for at least
a portion of the year.”137 This flexible time requirement allows corporations to fire
female directors who do not perform adequately and to make appropriate business
decisions without the threat of violating SB 826.
Thus, SB 826 is substantially related to the important purpose of meeting
California’s goal of diversifying the gender of boards of directors to reflect the
general and consumer population. The Supreme Court will most likely rule that SB
826 is a constitutional gender classification under an intermediate standard of
review.
B. Constitutionality of SB 826 If States Ratify the Equal Rights Amendment
A unique paradox exists for gender equality. On the one hand, many feminist
activists advocate for states to ratify the ERA to provide equal protection to all
people, regardless of sex. On the other hand, the ERA’s ratification threatens the
constitutionality of gender-conscious legislation aimed at leveling the playing field
for women.
133

Id.
Thomas, supra note 109, at 18109; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
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(citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975))).
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137
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(e)(3) (Deering 2018).
134

1288

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

The ERA provides that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.”138 The ERA does
not specify a standard of review. So, it is not guaranteed that the ERA would change
gender discrimination from intermediate scrutiny to strict scrutiny.139 Nonetheless,
legal scholars believe that by “adding a specific reference to sex equality to the
Constitution, the amendment would result in strict scrutiny for governmental
policies that discriminate based on sex and lead to a greater consideration of the
particular impact of decisions on women even in the private sector.”140
States that have amended their constitutions to include an equal rights
amendment offer insight on how the federal ERA would affect the standard of
review for sex discrimination. Twenty-five states have complete or partial
guarantees of equal rights based on sex in their state constitutions.141 Most states
have used their state equal rights amendments to apply strict scrutiny on sex-based
classifications—a higher degree of judicial scrutiny than the degree of scrutiny
currently provided under the federal Constitution.142 State courts have concluded
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that, like race, the “immutable” characteristic of sex143 subjects sex classifications
to strict scrutiny.144 Thus, the standard that states have adopted for their ERAs
suggests that a federal ERA would also subject sex-based classifications to the strict
scrutiny standard.145
The Supreme Court’s predictions about the ERA further foreshadow how a
future court may handle a sex classification under the ERA. In Frontiero v.
Richardson, four justices suggested, in dicta, that the ERA would require strict
scrutiny for sex-based classifications.146 At the time Frontiero was decided, “there
was every indication that the ERA would garner sufficient support in the states.”147
Justice Powell stated that the “Equal Rights Amendment, which, if adopted, will
resolve the substance of this precise question, has been approved by the Congress
and submitted for ratification by the States.”148 If the current Supreme Court treated
the ERA like the Frontiero Court, it would likely apply strict scrutiny to a gender
classification.
Under a strict scrutiny review, a government action that makes distinctions
based on suspect classifications149 will “only be upheld if the state can demonstrate
that the classification serves a compelling government interest and is ‘narrowly
tailored’ to accomplish that government interest.”150 Additionally, the government’s
law must be the least restrictive means of achieving the purpose.151 So, if the
ratification of the ERA changes the standard of review for gender classifications
from intermediate scrutiny to strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court “would likely
143
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prohibit [the] government from adopting policies designed to advance women’s
equality.”152 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may uphold a gender diversity
mandate like SB 826 under a strict scrutiny standard of review. However, it is much
more difficult for a classification to pass a strict scrutiny analysis than the current
intermediate scrutiny standard.
For women’s equality, the application of strict scrutiny is a double-edged
sword: “on the positive side, it might prevent courts from taking at face value claims
that ‘benign’ sex classifications were motivated by a desire to ameliorate
discrimination; on the negative side, it could curtail efforts at ‘genuine’ affirmative
action.”153 The Supreme Court’s current intermediate scrutiny standard for gender
classifications upholds proactive policies—like SB 826—to benefit women and
bolster equal opportunity. However, the ERA would likely prohibit sex-conscious
legislation by elevating sex-based legislation to strict scrutiny and cause the
government to ignore sex inequality.154 Prohibiting sex-conscious legislation would
disservice gender equality because gender discrimination is still prevalent,
especially on corporate boards. Without legally enforceable requirements, board
seats will continuously go to men.155
If states ratify the ERA, it is still possible that SB 826 may survive a strict
scrutiny standard of review. Race-conscious admission policies meet the “narrow
tailoring” requirement under strict scrutiny if the policy is “limited in time.”156
Although SB 826 does not have a cessation date, Senator Jackson cited a study
claiming “it could take more than 40 years for the numbers of women on boards to
152
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match men” as a significant reason for enacting SB 826.157 If gender equality in the
board room is met in the next few decades, “SB 826’s female board member
requirements will no longer be necessary,” and the legislation “will be rendered
moot, having no practical significance.”158 Thus, if the requirements under SB 826
would become no longer necessary, the law may meet the “limited in time”
requirement of strict scrutiny.159
Until the ERA is ratified and a gender classification is challenged, it is uncertain
which standard of review the Supreme Court would apply to a gender classification
under the ERA. Until then, if the Supreme Court reviews SB 826, it will most likely
analyze it under an intermediate standard of review.
III. CONCLUSION
If a court takes an opportunity to rule on whether SB 826 violates the Equal
Protection Clause, it is likely to uphold the gender diversity mandate under the Equal
Protection standard. SB 826’s gender classification easily meets the intermediate
scrutiny requirements because the gender diversity mandate is “substantially related
to a sufficiently important government interest”160 and is narrowly tailored.161
Moreover, SB 826 does not exclude men from current and future board positions.
In addition, SB 826 is showing results. By the year-end deadline, the amount
of California-based companies with all-male boards dropped from nearly 30% to
three percent.162 Nonetheless, SB 826’s future requirements to increase the number
of female board members for companies with five or more directors163 are vital to
the representation of women in leadership because “attaining critical mass, going . . .
to at least three women directors,164 creates an environment where women are no
longer seen as outsiders” 165 and can effectively contribute to board discussions and
decisions. Moreover, if “all of the companies in the Russell 3000 followed
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California’s lead, over 3,500 women’s voices would be added to corporate
governance.”166
SB 826 is constitutional and benefits women who are qualified to sit on boards
but have been overlooked due to their gender, as well as the shareholders of
California–based companies and the United States economy as a whole. Other states
should follow in California’s footsteps and enact legislation similar to SB 826 to
shatter the glass ceiling in the corporate board room.
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